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Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture Based on
Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems
Matthew Ranson* and Robert N. Stavinst

Abstract
The outcome of the December 2011 United Nadons climate negotiations in Durban,
South Africa, provides an importantnew opportunity to move toward an internadonalclimate
policy architecturethat is capable of delivering broad internationalpartipatdonand significant
global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of
potentialclimate policy architecturefor the post-Durbanera: links among indpendent tradable
permit systemsfor greenhouse gases. Because linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets,
there is tremendouspressure to link existing andplanned cap-and-tradesystems, and in fact, a
number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recentpoliticaland economic experience
with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban international
climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links between regional,
national, and sub-nationalcap-and-tradesystems, and in a longer-term, more comprehensive
bottom-up architecture of direct links. Although linkage will certainly help to reduce long-term
abatement costs, it may also serve as an effective mechanism for building institutionaland
politicalstructure to support afuture climate agreement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, with the signing of the 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Rio de Janeiro, the nations of the
world agreed to launch a process aimed at taking action against the risks posed
by global climate change. Some limited progress has been made toward that
goal: cap-and-trade systems for greenhouse gases are in place or under
development in the European Union (EU), Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand,
South Korea, Mexico, California, the northeastern United States, and several
Canadian provinces; Japan and several Chinese cities and provinces are
considering implementing such systems; and a global emission reduction credit
scheme-the Clean Development Mechanism-has an important constituency
in the world's developing countries. However, despite these initial steps,
international negotiations have not achieved their central objective: developing a
climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international
participation and significant global CO 2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost.'
The recent UNFCCC talks held in Durban, South Africa, in 2011, provide
an important opportunity to frame a new approach to this exceptionally difficult
global commons problem. A key product of the Durban negotiations is the
"Durban Platform for Enhanced Action," a non-binding agreement that calls for
a new climate treaty to be reached by 2015 that brings all countries under the
same legal regime by 2020.2 Because this agreement departs from the longstanding UNFCCC division of the world's countries into those with serious
emissions-reduction responsibilities (the Annex I countries) and those with no
responsibilities whatsoever, it opens up the negotiation process to new thinking
about international climate policy architecture.
In this Article, we evaluate one important component of international
architecture for the post-Durban era: links among regional, national, and subnational tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases. Because linkage allows
emitters in high-cost cap-and-trade systems to meet their compliance obligations
by purchasing allowances or credits from systems with lower marginal
abatement costs, it reduces the overall cost of achieving a given global emissions
target. Due to this reduction in aggregate costs, there is tremendous interestI

See generally Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (Princeton 2010).

2

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Establishment of an Ad Hoc Forking
Group on the Durban PlayformforEnhancedAction (Nov 2011), Decision 1/CP.17.

3

See Judson Jaffe and Robert N. Stavins, Linkage of Tradable Permit Sjstems in International Climate
Polig Architecture, in Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins, eds, Post-Koto International Climate
Polig: Implementing Architecturesfor Agreement 119, 129 (Cambridge 2010). As Metcalf and Weisbach
explain, international links can also be established among national policies (such as carbon taxes,
performance standards, and technology standards) that do not involve direct trading of emissions
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indeed pressure-to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in
fact, a number of links already or will soon exist.
Based on recent political and economic experience with linkage between
tradable permit systems, we draw several preliminary conclusions about the
near-term and long-term roles that linkage may play in post-Durban climate
policy architecture. Because the outline of a decentralized system of direct and
indirect linkages is already emerging, it is possible that in the absence of a topdown international agreement, such a collection of linkages will become the de
facto near-term architecture for post-Durban international climate policy. Such a
system has considerable promise for improving market stability while a broader
international climate agreement is being negotiated. However, because direct
linkages are currently planned only between systems in highly developed nations,
and because most cap-and-trade systems have placed limits on the use of
emissions reduction credits (which allow access to inexpensive abatement
opportunities in developing countries), the near-term cost savings from this ad
hoc system of links may be modest. Nonetheless, this system of linkages could
still play an important near-term role by providing the institutional and political
foundation for a future climate architecture. Additionally, in the longer term,
linkage could provide substantial cost savings while serving as either the
decentralized framework for an organic, bottom-up architecture, or as a
component of a larger top-down climate architecture.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II reviews the
basic economic theory of linkage between tradable permit systems. Section III
describes existing and proposed links among the world's cap-and-trade systems.
Section IV discusses the Durban Platform and its implications for future linkage,
and Section V assesses how linkage may contribute to future climate policy
architecture. Finally, Section VI concludes.

allowances or credits. See Gilbert Metcalf and David Weisbach, iUnking Policies When Tastes Differ
Global Climate Policy in a Heterogeneous World, 6 Rev Envir Econ & Poly 110, 122, 124 (2012).
However, as Metcalf and Weisbach and Hahn and Stavins argue, such non-trading links are more
challenging; and current political and business interest focuses mainly on linking tradable permit
systems. See Metcalf and Weisbach, Linking Policies When Tastes Difer at 123; Robert W. Hahn and
Robert N. Stavins, What Has the Kyoto Protocol Wrought? The Real Architecture of International Tradable
Permit Markets 18 (AEl 1999). Therefore, our exclusive focus in this paper is on linkage among
trading instruments in the wake of the Durban Platform.

406
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II. THEORY OF LINKAGE
We begin by describing different types of international linkages and
explaining how these can affect policy considerations such as cost effectiveness,
distribution of cost burdens, and national sovereignty and control.4
A. Types of Linkage
The economic and environmental effects of linking different systems
depend on the form of the link. One key distinction is between direct and
indirect linkage.'
1. Direct linkage
Direct linkage between two systems occurs when one or both systems
allow regulated entities to meet their compliance obligations by surrendering
allowances or credits obtained from the other system. These direct links can be
two-way (bilateral or multilateral) or one-way (unilateral).
Two-way direct linkage occurs when two cap-and-trade systems choose to
recognize each other's allowances. Because of the arbitrage opportunity posed
by different allowance prices, regulated entities in the system with the higher
allowance price will purchase allowances from the lower-price system. As a
result, emissions in the higher-price system will increase, but emissions from the
lower-price system will decrease by the same amount. This flow of allowances
will cause allowance prices to increase in the lower-price system and to decrease
in the higher-price system until, in principle, they converge to a common
intermediate price.
One-way direct linkage occurs when a cap-and-trade (CAT) system
recognizes credits from an emissions-reduction-credit (ERC) system' or from
another CAT system. In the former case, if the price of allowances is higher than
the price of credits, then regulated entities in the CAT system have an incentive
to purchase credits. This will increase the price of credits and reduce the price of
allowances, leading prices in the two systems to converge. However, if the initial
allowance price is lower than the credit price, then CAT participants will not
have any reason to purchase credits, and the one-way link will have no effect on
4

5

6

See generally Judson Jaffe, Matthew Ranson, and Robert N. Stavins, Linking Tradable Permit
Systems: A Key Element of Emerging International Climate Poliy Architecture, 36 Ecol L Q 789 (2009)
(presenting a more comprehensive treatment of the theory of linkage).
Id at 795-96.
An ERC system awards saleable credits to firms that implement voluntary projects that reduce
greenhouse gas emissions relative to what emissions would have been under a counterfactual
business-as-usual scenario. A prominent example of an ERC system is the Clean Development
Mechanism, described in Section III.
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prices or the distribution of emissions. Thus, a one-way link between a cap-andtrade system and a credit system ensures that the CAT system's allowance price
never exceeds the price of credits.
One-way direct linkage can also occur when one CAT system recognizes
allowances from a different CAT system. As in the case described above, this
type of one-way linkage ensures that allowance prices in the first CAT system
never exceed allowance prices in the CAT system whose allowances it
recognizes.
Governments may place limits on inter-system trading that prevent full
convergence of allowance prices. For example, a government may limit the
quantity of external allowances that can be used to demonstrate compliance in
its own system. Alternatively, an "exchange rate" may be applied to the price of
allowances or credits from other systems. Such a requirement might be used to
reduce inter-system trading or to ensure that trading with other systems leads to
a net reduction in emissions.
2. Indirect linkages
Indirect linkages occur when two systems link directly to a common third
system. Even though neither system directly links to the other, the indirect
linkage created by trading with the common system allows differences in the
supply and demand for allowances to propagate between the original two
systems.
An important type of indirect linkage occurs when two cap-and-trade
systems both create direct one-way links to the same ERC system. As a result of
these links, entities in the two CAT systems will compete for the ERC system's
credits. If the price of credits is lower than the price of allowances in both
systems, then this indirect linkage can lead prices in all three systems to
converge. As a result, developments in the market in one of the CAT systems
can affect the allowance price and emissions level in the other CAT system.
A series of bilateral (two-way) linkages between several CAT systems will
also result in indirect linkage. Such a system will have the same effects as direct
multilateral linkage among all of the systems. For example, if System A has a
two-way link with System B, which has a two-way link with System C, then
trading will-again, in principle-lead allowance prices to converge across all
three systems, despite the fact that A and C are not directly linked.
B. Implications of Linking
Linkage can affect overall cost-effectiveness, the distribution of economic
impacts, national control over policy design, and the incentives that nations face
in setting domestic emissions reduction targets. Each of these factors has
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implications for the role that linkage may play in a post-Durban international
policy architecture.'
1. Cost effectiveness
The most important benefit of linkage is to lower the aggregate costs of
emissions reductions by allowing firms in high-cost systems to pay for less
expensive abatement opportunities in lower-cost systems. The improvement in
cost-effectiveness will be greatest when the two systems face very different
marginal abatement costs. Furthermore, by enlarging the scope of the relevant
market, linking can improve market liquidity, reduce volatility in prices, and
lessen concerns about market power.
However, linkage can also have detrimental effects on the effectiveness of
domestic climate policies. A key concern is the problem of "additionality":
whether purchasing credits from an emissions-reduction-credit system truly
reduces overall emissions.' This problem arises from the difficulty of defining a
counterfactual baseline against which to measure the effects of projects intended
to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. If linkage allows regulated firms in
a cap-and-trade system to purchase ERC credits from emissions reduction
projects that would have occurred anyway, then linkage may actually cause
aggregate emissions to increase (or to decrease less than they otherwise would
have).
2. Distribution of policy impacts
Linkage can also change the distributional impacts of GHG policies on
regulated firms and the consumers that they serve. Whether a firm benefits or
suffers from a new link depends on: (1) whether the firm is a net seller or net
buyer of allowances, and (2) whether the firm is located in the higher- or lowerprice system. For example, after a link to a system with a higher price, net sellers
in the lower-price system will benefit from the opportunity to sell more
allowances, and to sell them at the higher post-linkage price. However, net
buyers in the lower-price system will have to pay a higher price after linking,
making them worse off. Thus, although linkage improves aggregate welfare in
both systems, it can also create individual winners and losers in both systems.
The distributional effects of linkage also depend on the type of systems
that are linked. For example, the creation of a one-way link between a cap-andtrade system and an emissions-reduction-credit system can only benefit
participants in the credit system, since these participants do not face mandatory
emissions targets and thus can only benefit from the opportunity to sell
7
8

See Jaffe, Ranson, and Stavins, 36 Ecol L Q at 799 (cited in note 4).
See Metcalf and Weisbach, 6 Rev Envir Econ & Poly at 116 (cited in note 3).
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emissions credits at higher prices. Hence, there is enthusiastic support for the
Clean Development Mechanism from the UNFCCC's non-Annex I countries. 9
3. National control
Because linkage exposes a domestic system to the design features and
market developments of any system to which it is linked, linkage can reduce
national control over the economic and environmental impacts of domestic
climate change policies. However, the degree to which domestic systems lose
control depends on whether links are two-way or one-way. For example, costcontainment measures-such as banking, borrowing, offsets, or safety-valve
provisions-will propagate completely across a two-way link between two capand-trade systems. In contrast, under a one-way linkage, cost-containment
measures will propagate only to the system that accepts the other's allowances."
4. Incentives for setting caps
An additional concern about linkage is that it changes the incentives that
jurisdictions face when setting their respective emissions caps." Because a link
can affect the allowance price within a linked jurisdiction, it can alter the
fundamental tradeoff a government faces between the value it can create by
issuing additional allowances and the marginal environmental damage that can
arise from issuing such allowances. By expanding the scope of the allowance
market, linkage can reduce the impact that the issuance of additional allowances
has on allowance prices and therefore on the value of existing allowances.
Further, by allowing nations with high domestic emission reduction costs to
purchase less expensive emission reductions from other systems, linking can
reduce the costs that such nations would face in committing to more stringent
caps, thereby partially offsetting some of these effects.
For example, when a small cap-and-trade system establishes a direct link
with a larger cap-and-trade system, the administrator of the smaller system may
be tempted to issue a larger number of allowances in order to raise government
revenues or benefit domestic firms. Alternatively, linkage to the larger allowance
market may allow the smaller system to tighten its cap dramatically, achieving its
targets by displacing costs onto foreign firms in the linked system.

9

10

"

See Michael Wara, Is the GlobalCarbonMarket Working?, 445 Nature 595, 595 (2007).
Technically speaking, some price effects of cost-containment measures do propagate in both
directions of a one-way linkage, via supply and demand effects in the linking and target systems.
See Carsten Helm, InternationalEmissions Trading with Endogenous Allowance Choices, 87 J Pub Econ
2737, 2737-38 (2003).
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III. CHARACTERISTICS OF EXISTING
AND PROPOSED LINKAGES
Despite the hiatus in the US of serious consideration of a national CO 2
cap-and-trade system, such systems are in place or under development in the
European Union, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Mexico,
California, the northeastern US, and several Canadian provinces, and are under
consideration in Japan and parts of China." Additionally, a global emissionsreduction-credit scheme (the Clean Development Mechanism) has an important
constituency of supporters in the world's developing countries.U In this section,
we review these systems and describe existing and proposed links among them.
A. Linkage Among Existing Trading Systems
Because governments face strong economic and political incentives to link
to other systems, there are already a number of links established or proposed
between existing tradable GHG (mostly CO) permit systems.
1. Emissions trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol
Under the Kyoto Protocol, each Annex I country took on a quantitative
emissions target for the 2008 to 2012 compliance period. These emissions
targets are expressed in Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). Under Article 17 of
the protocol, AAUs may be bought and sold by national governments, with the
condition that each government must have a sufficient number of AAUs at the
end of the compliance period to cover its actual emissions.1 When two
governments exchange AAUs, they create an implicit link between their
domestic climate policies.
An important obstacle to the successful operation of such a system is that
by its very nature, the trading is among nations." Unlike private firms, nationstates are not simple cost-minimizers, and so there is no reason to anticipate that
competitive pressures will lead to equating of marginal abatement costs across
countries. Furthermore, even if nations did try to minimize costs, they would
not have sufficient information about the marginal abatement costs of domestic
firms to define their own national aggregate marginal cost functions." Thus,
See Guoyi Han, et al, China's Carbon Emission Trading: An Overview of Cumnt Development 10
(FORES 2012).
13
See Wara, 445 Nature at 595 (cited in note 9).
14 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Art 3 § 10
(1997), 37 ILM 22 (1998).
15 See Hahn and Stavins, What Has the Kyoto ProtocolWrought? at 10 (cited in note 3).
16
Id at 9.
12
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such a system does not have the cost-effectiveness property ordinarily associated
with tradable permit systems among firms, and the notion of linkage via trading
between countries may be more of a metaphor than a practical policy. To date,
sales of AAUs have been modest relative to sales of other types of credits."
2. Clean Development Mechanism
The Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the
world's largest emissions-reduction-credit system." Under the CDM, firms and
other entities in non-Annex I (developing) countries can be awarded certified
emission reduction (CER) credits for conducting voluntary projects that reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. 9 These projects can take a variety of possible forms,
such as building new wind farms, installing more energy efficient equipment in
manufacturing facilities, or capturing methane from landfills.20 CERs can then be
purchased by regulated emitters in Annex I countries for use in meeting their
domestic emissions commitments.2' CERs could also be used for entities
covered by cap-and-trade systems in countries that are not parties to the
protocol (in particular, the US).22
From the perspective of the developing countries, the CDM provides a
mechanism for financing "sustainable development."23 From the perspective of
the industrialized countries, the CDM provides a means to engage developing
countries in the control of GHG emissions while simultaneously reducing the
costs of achieving domestic emissions targets.24 Because it tends to be much less
expensive to construct new low-carbon energy infrastructure in developing
nations than to modify or replace existing infrastructure in industrialized

17

18

19

See Marton Kruppa, Slovakia Ejes AAU Sales to Spain: PointCarbon (Reuters Dec 21, 2011),
http: / /www.reuters.com/article/2011 /12/21 /us-carbon-slovakia-aauat
online
idUSTRE7BK17V20111221 (visited Oct 16, 2012); US Energy Information Administration,
AnnualEnergy Outlook 2011, DOE/EIA-0383 (April 2011).
See Wara, 445 Nature at 595 (cited in note 9). Anja Kollmuss, Helge Zink, and Clifford Polycarp,
Making Sense of the Voluntag Carbon Market: A Comparison of Carbon Offset Standards *93 (WWF
Germany 2008), online at assets.panda.org/downloads/vcm-report-final.pdf (visited Nov 4,
2012).
See UNFCCC, CDM Fact Sheet: General (May 2012), online at http://cdm.unfccc.int/press/docs/
CDMfactsheet.pdf (visited Nov 1, 2012).

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

See Franck Lecocq and Philippe Ambrosi, The Clean Development Mechanism: Histoy, Status, and
Prospects, I Rev Envir Econ & Poly 134, 139 (2007).

23

See Kyoto Protocol, Art 12 5 2.

24

Id.
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countries, 25 international trading in CERs could significantly reduce the
aggregate cost of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.
A number of cap-and-trade programs explicitly allow the use of CDM
credits, including existing systems in the European Union, Switzerland, and New
Zealand, as well as a future system in Australia. 26 Most CDM projects have been
funded by European parties: Investors in the United Kingdom have sponsored
31 percent of all CDM projects, Swiss investors have sponsored 21 percent,
Japanese investors 10 percent, Dutch 9 percent, Swedish 7 percent, and German
5 percent. 27
The CDM has accounted for annual C0 2-equivalent reductions of 278
million tons, about 1 percent of annual global emissions of CO 2. 28 The largest
shares of CERs have been generated in China (55 percent) and India (15
percent), with Latin America and the Caribbean making up another 14 percent
of the total. Brazil, at 6 percent, is the largest CER producer in that region. 29 Of
the CERs expected to be generated by projects in the CDM pipeline by 2012, 35
percent are for renewables, 29 percent are for HFC and N 20 reduction, 19
percent are for methane reduction, and the remaining 17 percent are for
electricity generation, fuel switching, and other projects.30
As an ERC system, the CDM raises important concerns about additionality
(the problem of whether basing credits on an unobservable hypothetical baseline
leads to credits being granted for emission reductions that would have occurred
in any case). Empirical analysis has validated these concerns, with estimates that
25

See Wara, 445 Nature at 595 (cited in note 9).

26

See Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Pariament and of the Council 18, European Parliament,
L338 Official J EU (Oct 27, 2004); Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, Emissions, Credits,
Offsetting and Trading (Nov 2007), Referenz/Aktenzeichen: G452-1577; Guidance on the Use of CERe
in the NZ ETS, New Zealand Ministry for the Environment (2012), online at
http://climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/building/regulatory-updates/guidanceidentifying-banned-restriction-cers.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2012); Australian Clean Energy
International Unit Surrender Charge Act 2011, No. 158 § 8 (2011), online at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011A00158/Download (visited Oct 16, 2012); European
Commission, EU Action Against Clmate Change: The EU Emissions Trading Scheme 23 (2008), online
at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/ets-en.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2012).

27

See UNFCCC, Registered Projects by AI and NAI Investor Parties (Sept 2012), online at
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/RegisteredProjAnnex1PartiesPieChart.html (visited
Oct 16, 2012).
See Wara, 445 Nature at 595 (cited in note 9). Note that carbon sequestration projects of
forestation and reduced deforestation are not included in the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol's
first commitment period, 2008-12.

28

29

See UN

Environment Programme, CDM Projects by Host Region (Sept 2012), online
http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-region.htm (visited Oct 16, 2012).

30

See UN Environment Programme, CDM Projects Grounded in Type (Sept 2012), online at
http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm (visited Oct 16,2012).
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many claimed reductions would have occurred even in the absence of the
program.'
An additional concern has centered on the fact that nearly 30 percent of
average annual CERs have come from the destruction of HFC-23, a potent
GHG that is a byproduct of the manufacture of certain refrigerant gases.32 It is
very inexpensive to destroy HFC-23, and companies can earn nearly twice as
much from the sale of CDM credits as they can from selling respective
refrigerant gases. 33 As a result, it has been argued that plants were being built
simply for the purpose of generating CERs from destruction of HFC-23.
Because of this, beginning in 2013, CERs from HFC-23 destruction will not be
valid for purposes of compliance with the EU Emissions Trading System.34
As negotiations continue regarding the details of a second commitment
period for the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM will most likely continue to function in
any case. 3 ' However, a variety of proposals have been put forward to improve its
structure and implementation, many targeted at increasing the additionality of
approved projects.3 ' There have also been discussions of alternative mechanisms
for engaging developing countries, such as "new market mechanisms" for
sectoral crediting.37
3. Joint Implementation
Joint Implementation (JI) is another Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanism.
It allows entities in Annex I countries to generate and sell offset credits-known
as Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)-to one another." Like the CDM, JI is a
31 See Junie Zhang and Can Wang, Co-Benefits and Adlionalipy of the Clean Development Mechanism. An
32

33
34

35

36

37

38

EmpiricalAnalysis,62 J Envir Econ and Mgmt 140, 142 (2011).
See UN Environment Programme, Groivth of Total Expected Accumulated 2012 CERs (Sept 2012),
online at http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cers.htm (visited Oct 16, 2012).
Wara, 445 Nature at 596 (cited in note 9).
See European Commission, Emissions Traing: Commission Welcomes Vote to Ban CertainIndustrialGas
Credits (Jan 2011), online at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/
11/56 (visited Oct 16, 2012).
See Daniel Bodansky, W[b]ither the Kyoto Protocol? Durban and Beyond, Viewpoints 1, 6 (Harvard
at
online
2011),
Aug
Agreements
Climate
on
Project
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Bodansky_Viewpoint-Final.pdf (visited Nov 22,2012).
See Daniel S. Hall, et al, Polidesfor Developing Country Engagement, in Aldy and Stavins, eds, Post-Kyoto
InternationalClimate Polg 649, 660 (cited in note 3).
See International Emissions Trading Association, IETA Response to the AWG-LCA Callfor Input
Regarding New Market-Based Mechanisms *1 (Feb 2011), online at https://ieta.membercicks.net/
assets/EUWG/ieta-awg-lca-submission-on-market-based-mechanisms-feb-2011-3-web.pdf
(visited Oct 16, 2012).
See Joseph Aldy and Robert N. Stavins, The Promise and Problems of Pridng Carbon: Theoy and
Experience, Belfer Center Discussion Paper *17 n 16 (Harvard University Nov 2011), online at
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project-based ERC system whose credits raise concerns about additionality,
although the concerns are somewhat different since countries that can
participate in JI projects have caps under the Kyoto Protocol.
The market for ERUs has been less robust than the market for CERs. As
of April 2012, host countries had issued 233 million ERUs. 39 Of the 612
approved projects, 194 were based in Ukraine, 178 in Russia, 59 in the Czech
Republic, 39 in Bulgaria, and 25 in Poland, with the remainder primarily in
Europe.4
4. European Union Emissions Trading System
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a
downstream CO 2 cap-and-trade system that is by far the world's largest carbon
pricing regime.4' This system, which was adopted in 2003, covers about half of
2
CO 2 emissions from thirty European countries." The EU ETS has been
implemented in phases: a first (pilot) phase from 2005 to 2007, a second (Kyoto)
phase from 2008 to 2012, and a scheduled third phase from 2013 to 2020.
Although the first phase allowed trading only in carbon dioxide, the second
phase broadened the program to include some other GHGs from certain
industrial sectors, such as nitrous oxide emissions from nitric acid production.
The 11,500 regulated sources include large sources such as oil refineries,
combustion installations over twenty megawatts thermal, coke ovens, cement
factories, and pulp and paper producers. 43 Although EU ETS allowance prices
averaged C22 in the second half of 2008, prices had fallen to C7 in 2012 as the
economic recession brought reduced economic activity and decreased demand
for allowances."

39
4
41

42

43

44

http://ive.belfercenter.org/f iles/Aldy/ 20Stavins/o20Pricing%20Carbon/o20ENRP.pdf (visited
Nov 1, 2012).
See United Nations Environment Programme, Status of JI Projects, (Sep 1, 2012), online at
http://cdmpipeline.org/ji-projects.htm (visited Oct 16, 2012).
Id.
See European Commission, Emissions Tradng System (EU ETS) (2010), online at
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index-en.htm (visited Oct 16, 2012).
Id. The EU ETS covers all 27 EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway joined the EU ETS in 2008, although sources in Iceland are
not yet subject to an emissions cap.
See A. Denny Ellerman and Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme:
Ongins, Allocation, and Early Results, 1 Rev Envir Econ & Poly 66, 68, 72 n 9 (2007).
In addition, a set of "complementary policies," such as those aimed at increasing the use of
renewable sources of energy, have had the effect of reducing emissions in one sector only to see
them increase in other sectors under the EU ETS umbrella, thereby accomplishing no additional
net emissions reductions, but increasing aggregate costs (decreasing cost effectiveness) by
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The European Commission's Linking Directive allowed EU ETS
participants to use CERs from the CDM beginning in 2005 and ERUs from the
JI program beginning in 2008, although certain types of projects, such as land
use change, forestry, and nuclear power, have not been eligible for credits, 4 5 and
industrial gas destruction projects will cease to be eligible after 2013.4 Because
of these links, CER and ERU prices are heavily dependent on EU ETS
allowance prices.47
During the first and second trading periods, EU ETS member nations each
set national limits on the use of credits as a percentage of total allowances, with
limits ranging from 0 percent in Estonia to 20 percent in Lithuania and Spain.48
In future trading periods, the European Commission has mandated that no
more than half of the EU ETS overall emissions reductions target may be
achieved through credits. Furthermore, for projects initiated in 2013 or later, the
EU ETS will recognize CERs only from nations on the UN's list of Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) (most of which are in Africa), thereby eliminating
projects from the countries that currently dominate the supply, most notably
China and India. CERs flowing from projects begun prior to 2013 in more
developed non-Annex I countries will continue to be allowed.49
To some degree, the EU ETS can itself be viewed as a large multilateral
linkage among its member counties, in which each country recognizes
allowances issued by all other members.50 This was particularly true in the first
and second trading periods, during which each country proposed its own

maintaining heterogeneous marginal abatement costs, and reducing allowance prices in the EU
ETS.
45

See Direcive2004/ 101/EC of the European Parlamentand ofthe Coundl at 18; European Commission,
EU Action Against Climate Change: The EU Emissions TradingScheme at 23 (cited in note 26).

46

See European Commission, Emissions Trading: Commission Welcomes Vote to Ban CertainIndustial Gas
Credits (cited in note 34).

47

See, for example, Oliver Sartor, The EU ETS Carbon Price: To Intervene, or Not to Intervene?, 12
Climate Brief CDC Climate Research 1 (Feb 2012); CER Market Steadies After Price Hit
http://www.carbonpositive.net/
at
online
2008),
10,
Nov
(CarbonPositive,
viewarticle.aspx?articlelD=1335 (visited Oct 16, 2012); Point Carbon Advisory Services, Issues in
the International Carbon Market, 2008-2012 and Beyond 3-4 (Study for New Zealand Emissions
Trading Group, Oct 2007); CER Prices Ease with EU Carbon, (CarbonPositive, Feb 15, 2007),
online at http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articlelD=670 (visited Oct 16, 2012).

48

See European Commission, Emissions Trading: Commission Adopts Decisions on Amendments to Five
NationalAllocation Plansfor 2008-2012 2 (Jul 2007), IP/07/1094.

49

See European Commission, Questions and Answers on Use of International Credits in the Third Trading
Phase of the EU ETS (Nov 14, 2011), online at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/
linking/docs/q_a.20111114_en.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2012).
See Denny Ellerman, The EU Emission Tradng Scheme: A Prototype Global System?, in Aldy and
Stavins, eds, Post-Kyoto InternationalClimate Podiy 88, 88, 90 (cited in note 3).
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individual emissions cap for review by the European Commission." This created
incentives for individual countries to try to be generous with their allowances to
protect their economic competitiveness.52 Not surprisingly, the result was an
aggregate cap that-at least in Phase I-exceeded business-as-usual emissions."
However, for future trading periods, caps have been determined through a more
centralized process at the EU level.5 4
5. Norwegian Emissions Trading Scheme
From 2005 to 2007, Norway operated an Emissions Trading Scheme,
which covered 10 percent to 15 percent of national CO 2 emissions and imposed
a cap equal to 95 percent of 1998-2001 levels." The system included a one-way
linkage with the EU ETS, which allowed Norwegian firms to meet their
compliance obligations by purchasing emissions permits from the EU ETS." In
2007, the three non-EU member countries of the European Economic AreaNorway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein-joined the EU ETS through the adoption
of the EU ETS Directive" into the European Economic Area (EEA)
agreement. With this agreement, Norway and the other EEA members agreed
to follow the same process for setting national caps as the EU member states.

s

52

See Joseph Kruger, Wallace Oates, and William Pizer, Decentraiationin the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme and Lessons for GlobalPolig,1 Rev Envir Econ & Poly 112, 115-16 (2007).
See Frank Convery and Luke Redmond, Market and Price Developments in the European Union
Emissions TradingScheme, 1 Rev Envir Econ & Poly 88, 94 (2007).

s3

Due to a variety of factors, including the economic recession and the ability of regulated entities
to bank allowances into Phase III, it is difficult to assess the system's performance in Phase II.

54

See Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Paramentand of the Council, European Parliament, LI 40
Official J EU 63 (May 9, 2009); European Commission, Allocation 2005-2012 (Nov 15, 2010),
online at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allocation/indexen.htm (visited Oct 16, 2012).

55

The Norwegian ETS was designed to be compatible with the EU ETS. See M.J. Mace, et al,
Analysis of the Legal and OrganisationalIssues Arising in Lenking the EU Emissions Trading Scheme to Other
Existing and Emerging Emissions Trading Schemes 6 (Study Commissioned by the European
Commission Directorate General-Environment, Climate Change, and Air, May 2008).

56

Annegrete Bruvoll and Hanne Marit Dalen, Pricingof CO2 Emissions in Norway: Documentation of Data
and Methods Used in Estimations of Average C02 Tax Rates in Nonvegian Sectors in 2006, Statistics
Norway 1, 18 (2009).

57

Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, European Parliament (Oct 13,
2003),
online
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:
2003L0087:20090625:EN:PDF (visited Nov 4, 2012), as amended.

58

See European Commission, Emissions Trading: Commission Announces Lenkage EU ETS with Norway,
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/
(Oct
26,
2007),
online
Iceland, and Liechtenstein
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1617 (visited Oct 16, 2012); Norwegian Ministry of the
Environment, Norway's Fifth National Communication Under the Framework Convention on Climate
Change: Status Report as of December 2009 36-37 (Dec 2009). Iceland and Liechtenstein did not
previously have cap-and-trade systems.
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6. Swiss CO 2 Act
Since 2008, Switzerland has operated a quasi-voluntary cap-and-trade
system based on the authority of its CO 2 Act. Under this program, companies
can be exempted from a mandatory CO 2 tax on fossil fuels in exchange for
taking on a legal commitment under the cap-and-trade system." Under the Swiss
system, companies may meet up to 8 percent of their emissions targets using
CDM and JI credits."o Although Swiss and EU participants cannot currently use
each other's allowances, the Swiss government has begun negotiations with the
European Commission to create a link between the Swiss trading program and
the EU ETS, mostly likely starting in 2014.
7. New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme
In January 2008, the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS)
was launched. The forestry sector entered the program first, in 2008, and
stationary energy, industrial, and liquid fossil fuel sectors joined in 2010. Early
evidence suggests that the forestry component has deterred deforestation,
although international policy and consequent price uncertainty are major
problems for investment.6 2 The waste (landfills) sector is scheduled to enter in
2013, and agriculture-which accounts for nearly half of New Zealand's gross
emissions-is scheduled to enter in 2015. Thus, the intention of the system is
to include all sectors of the economy and all greenhouse gases by 2 0 1 5 .' The
NZ ETS features free allocation of allowances, with special protections (outputbased updating allocations) for emission-intensive, trade-sensitive sectors, as well
as a safety valve that allows participants to meet their obligations by paying a fee
of NZ$25 per ton.s Additionally, a recent five-year government review

59
60

See Mace, et al, Analysis of the Legal and Organisational Issues Arising in Linking the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme at 7-8 (cited in note 55).
See Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, Emissions, Credits, Offsetting and Trading 3 (Nov
2007).

61

62

See Council of the European Union, EU to Link Its Grenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System with
SuitZerland (Dec 20, 2010), 18085/10 PRESSE 353; Switzerland sees EU ETS link in 2014 (Point
Carbon, May 11, 2012), online at http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.1861881 (visited Oct 16,
2012).
See Eric Karpas and Suzi Kerr, Preliminay Evidence on Responses to the New Zealand Foresty Emissions
TradingScheme *36-38 (Motu Working Paper 11-09,June 2011).

63

See generally NZ Ministry for the Environment, The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme, online
at http://www.cimatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/ (visited Oct 16, 2012).

6

See Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel, Doing New Zealand's Fair Share: Emissions Trading
Scheme Review 2011: Final Report 6 (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, June 30, 2011).
Id at 29; New Zealand Climate Change Response Act, Pub Act 2002 No 40 § 222C (Nov 18,
2005).
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recommended that the agriculture sector face a lower price as it enters the
system."
Currently, the NZ ETS allows participants to use an unlimited number of
credits from the CDM and JI programs, as well as AAU allowances converted
from other UNFCCC signatories. Preliminary emissions registry data suggest
that 20 percent of New Zealand emissions have been covered using relatively
inexpensive AAUs from Hungary.6' However, certain categories of offset credits
are not eligible, such as those based on HFC-23 and N20 industrial gas
destruction.6 9 The ETS also includes several features intended to protect
participants from the potential price effects of international demand for its
allowances (known as New Zealand Units, or NZUs). The establishing
legislation prohibits export of NZUs if the total number of NZUs held within
the country falls below 90 percent of the initial allocation for that trading period.
Additionally, in response to the recession, in 2009 the New Zealand government
prohibited participants in all sectors except forestry from exporting any
allowances until 2013.70
Some features of the New Zealand ETS, particularly the way that
allowances are allocated, were chosen for compatibility with Australia's
previously proposed Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS). Although the
CPRS never became law, the possibility of linking to a future Australian system
was-and is-an important consideration for the New Zealand ETS, especially
in light of the close trade relationship between the two countries.' In 2011, the
New Zealand government announced plans to establish a two-way linkage with
Australia's forthcoming emissions trading program,7 2 beginning in 2015." The
details of this linkage have not yet been finalized.

66
67
68

69
70

71
72
73

See Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel, Doing New Zealand's FairShare at 8 (cited in note
64).
See Ministry for the Environment and the Treasury, The Frameworkfor a New Zealand Emissions
TradingScheme 46-48 (Sep 2007), Pub No. ME 810.
Recent Global Carbon Poltics, 7:34 Carbon Market North America 5 (Reuters 2012), online at
http://www.pointcarbon.com/polopoly-fs/1.1972695!CMNA20120831.pdf
(visited Nov 4,
2012).
See New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, Guidance on the Use of CERs in the NZ ETS (Feb
2012).
See New Zealand Climate Change Response Act, Pub Act 2002 No 40 at § 222G.
See Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel, Doing New Zealand's FairShare at 28 (cited in note
64).
Australia Clean Energy Act, No 131, ComLaw Authoritative Act C201 1A00131 (2011).
See Greg Combet and Tim Groser, jointMedia Release: Australia and New ZealandAdvance Linking of
Their Emissions TradingSchemes, 333/11 GC 1 (Dec 5, 2011).
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Establishing a direct linkage between the New Zealand ETS and the EU
ETS poses greater challenges. Because forest sink credits are a major part of the
New Zealand ETS but are not allowed by the EU ETS, the creation of a direct
link between the two systems is unlikely in the near future.74 However, as a result
of its direct link to the CDM, the New Zealand ETS does have an indirect
linkage to the EU ETS. Because non-forestry New Zealand sources are required
to surrender only one allowance per two units of emissions until 2013, the
current effective price of NZ allowances is very low. 7 1
8. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a downstream cap-andtrade program that limits CO 2 emissions from power sector sources in nine
northeastern US states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont). Like the EU ETS,
RGGI can be envisioned, to some degree, as a linked set of state-level cap-andtrade programs.
The system is both narrow in its sectoral coverage and unambitious in
terms of its emissions reduction objectives. RGGI took effect in 2009 after
approval by individual state legislatures and set a goal of lowering emissions to
10 percent below 2009 levels by 2019.77 It was originally anticipated that meeting
this goal would require a reduction of approximately 35 percent below businessas-usual emissions levels.7 " However, due to the combined effects of the
economic recession and drastic declines in natural gas prices relative to coal
prices, the cap is no longer binding and is unlikely to become binding through
2020, unless the cap trajectory is adjusted.

74

See Brian Fallow, NZ-Europe ETS Link a Long Way Off Says Official, NZ Herald (Mar 30, 2011),
online at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/economy/news/article.cfm?c-id=34&objectid=10715758
(visited Nov 1, 2012).

7s

See New Zealand Climate Change Response Act, Pub Act 2002 No 40 at § 222B; Karpas and
Kerr, PreliminaryEvidence at *26 (cited in note 62).
See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), About the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), online at http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGIFact_- Sheet.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2012). In
May of 2011, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie announced that his state would withdraw from
the system. See Mireya Navarro, Christie Pulls NewJersey From 10-State Climate Initiative, NY Times
A20 (May 27, 2011).

76

77

See Aldy and Stavins, The Promise and ProblemsofPriing Carbonat *15 (cited in note 38).
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Id.

79

See id; RGGI, About the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiaive (RGGI) (cited in note 76). Allowance
prices have reflected these realities, falling from approximately $3 per ton of CO 2 at the first
auction in September 2008, to the floor price of $1.93 per ton in 2012. See RGGI CO 2 Allowance
https://rggionline
at
Price
Report
(2012),
Transaction
Tracking
Report,
coats.org/eats/rggi/index.cfm?fuseaction=reportsv2.price-rpt&%/20clearfuseatt/ 20ribs=true
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The Model Rule governing RGGI's implementation allows for two types
of one-way linkages. First, covered sources may meet up to 3.3 percent of their
compliance obligations using allowances generated by certain types of offset
CO 2 projects located in one of the RGGI states or in another US jurisdiction
that has completed a memorandum of understanding with the RGGI states. 0
The 3.3 percent limitation was chosen so that no more than half of all emissions
reductions between 2009 and 2020, relative to projected baseline emissions at
the time the Model Rule was written, would be achieved using offsets." To
address uncertainty about future abatement costs, the rule includes price triggers
that allow greater use of offsets if average annual allowance prices exceed certain
thresholds. If the price exceeds $7 (in 2005 dollars), sources may use offsets for
up to 5 percent of their compliance obligations, and if the price exceeds a "stage
two threshold price" that begins at $10 in 2005 and increases by about 2 percent
each subsequent year, then sources may use offsets for up to 10 percent of their
compliance obligations.82
The second type of linkage allowed by RGGI is one-way linkage to other
international CAT and ERC systems. If annual allowance prices exceed the
"stage two threshold price," then RGGI sources may satisfy their compliance
obligations using CERs from UNFCCC emissions-reduction-credit programs or
allowances from any other cap-and-trade system outside the United States.
As of the spring of 2012, no applications for approval for offset projects
have ever been submitted to RGGI84 because of the low RGGI allowance
price." Furthermore, because RGGI prices have remained far below the $10

80

81

(visited Oct 16, 2012). In response, RGGI states are considering lowering the emissions cap for
the 2014 to 2020 period. See RGGI OficiaLr to Weigh Lower CO2 Caps (Point Carbon, Mar 5, 2012),
online at http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.1784558 (visited Oct 16, 2012).
See RGGI, Part XX CO2 Budget Trading Program, 63, 105 (Jan 5, 2007), online at
http://rggi.org/docs/model-rule-corrected_1_507.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2012). The Revised
Memorandum of Understanding among the RGGI states also allows offset credits from nonRGGI US states with cap-and-trade systems. See RGGI, Amendment to Memorandum of
Understanding2 (Aug 8, 2006), online at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_8_8_06.pdf (visited Oct
16, 2012). However, this provision was not included in the Model Rule that serves as the basis for
the state regulations.
See RGGI, Anaysis Supporting Offsets Limit Recommendation (May 1, 2006), online at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/offsets_1imit_5_1_06.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2012).

82

See RGGI, PartXX CO2 Budget Trading Programat 17-18, 63 (cited in note 80).

83

Id at 105-06.

84

See RGGI CO 2 Allowance Tracking System, Pubc: Offset Projects (2012), online at https://rggicoats.org/eats/rggi/index.cfm?fuseaction=search.project offset&clearfuse/o20attribs=true
(visited Oct 16, 2012).

85

See
RGGI,
Fact Sheet:
RGGI
CO2
Allowance Auctions
(2010),
online
at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI AuctionsinBrief.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2012); RGGI CO 2
Allowance Tracking System, TransactionPrice Report (cited in note 79).
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stage two threshold price, RGGI sources have never been permitted to use
CERs or other CAT systems' allowances."
B. Possible Linkage Among Future Trading Systems
Several new cap-and-trade systems will come into effect in the near future.
Although details of these systems remain to be determined through
promulgation of specific regulations, the respective authorizing legislation
provides insights into the likely future role of linkage in each system."
1. Australia's Clean Energy Act of 2011
In 2011, Australia's government passed its Clean Energy Act, which
imposes a carbon tax of approximately AUD$25/ton for the period from 2012
to 2015, after which the tax is to be replaced by a cap-and-trade system." The
Act includes a number of features directed at possible linkage with other
systems. Import and export of allowances is allowed," although the government
may set charges on international allowances and credits of up to AUD$15 in
2015, AUD$16 in 2016, and AUD$17.05 in 2017."
Furthermore, the government is tasked specifically with developing
regulations on the use of foreign allowances that take into account Australia's
international objectives and obligations as well as the environmental integrity of
Australia's system.91 As discussed above, Australia and New Zealand have
announced plans to link their trading systems beginning in 2015, once Australia's
carbon tax converts to a cap-and-trade system. 92 Additionally, Australian and
European Commission officials have announced plans to allow Australian capand-trade participants to use EU ETS allowances to cover up to 50 percent of
their liabilities starting in 2015, via a one-way linkage. By 2018, the EU and
Australia have agreed to establish a full two-way linkage between their emissions
trading systems. To facilitate this connection, Australia has agreed to drop its
plans for a carbon price floor and to limit the use of Kyoto credits (such as
CERs and ERUs) to no more than 12.5 percent of total emissions.93

88

See RGGI, PadXX CO2 Budget TradingProgramat 17-18, 63 (cited in note 80).
We exclude some systems from our analysis. As of early 2012, British Columbia, Manitoba, and
Ontario have not yet finalized cap-and-trade regulations.
See Australia Clean Energy Act, No 131 § 100.

89

Id at §§ 108-09.

90
91

See Australian Clean Energy International Unit Surrender Charge Act 2011, No 158
See Australia Clean Energy Act, No 131 § 123.
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See Combet and Groser, jointMedia Release (cited in note 73).
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2. California's Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006
California's Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 directed the California
Air Resources Board (CARB) to promulgate regulations to achieve the goal of
reducing the state's greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2020, a
very ambitious target by North American standards. In 2011, CARB finalized a
rule that establishes a cap-and-trade system as the primary mechanism by which
the state will achieve this goal, beginning in 2013.94 The regulation includes
several cost-containment measures, including banking of allowances and a
strategic allowance reserve, as well as allowing for linkage to other systems.95
Two types of links are allowed by current regulations governing the capand-trade system. First, facilities may use offsets (of any approved type) for up
to 8 percent of their compliance obligations.96 Initially, credit will only be given
for offsets from US based projects involving forestry, dairy digesters, and
destruction of ozone-depleting substances. However, the regulations create a
framework for possible future linkage to CDM, JI, and other international ERC
programs," and California has completed a joint memorandum of understanding
with Chiapas, Mexico, and Acre, Brazil, that could allow the use of avoided
deforestation offsets from these two states as soon as 2015.9' Second, the
regulations allow for unrestricted use of allowances from directly linked cap-andtrade systems.9 9 In March 2012, regulations were proposed that would create a
two-way direct link with Quebec's cap-and-trade system, although this linkage

pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/ 12/916&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLan
guage=en (visited Oct 16, 2012).
94

See California Environmental Protection Agency, Ovendew ofARB Emissions Trading Program (Oct
20, 2011), online at http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/2011/cap_trade-overview.pdf (visited Oct
16, 2012).

95

Id.

96

See California Cap on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Market-Based Compliance Mechanisms,
Cal Code Reg 10-5 § 95854.

97

98

See California Environmental Protection Agency, Overview ofARB Emissions Trading Program (cited
in note 94).
See Daniel F. Morris, Nathan Richardson, and Anne Riddle, Importing Climate Miigaion: The
Potendal and Challenges of InternationalForest Ofsets in Cakfornia Climate Poig 1 (Resources for the
Future 2011).

9

See Cal Code Reg 10-5
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was delayed by a legislative subcommittee in 2012.100 Links with other US states
and Canadian provinces may come later via the Western Climate Initiative.101
3. Quebec's cap-and-trade system
In 2011, the Quebec government adopted regulations establishing a capand-trade system for industrial facilities emitting more than 25,000 tons of CO 2
per year. 10 2 This system, which will begin capping emissions starting in 2013, is
explicitly based on design criteria established by the Western Climate Initiative. 03
Indeed, the regulation allows for linkage with other cap-and-trade systems with
which the government of Quebec has concluded an agreement, and Quebec
plans to link to California's cap-and-trade system.104 However, the Qu6bec
system restricts facilities from using domestic offsets to cover more than 8
percent of their emissions and does not currently allow linking with international
sources of offset credits, such as the CDM.0 o
4. China's emissions trading system pilots
In late 2010, the Chinese government released its Twelfth Five-Year-Plan,
which calls for the establishment of a national carbon emission trading system
by 2015. The government has begun work to establish pilot cap-and-trade
programs in the cities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Shenzhen,
and the provinces of Hubei and Guangdong, by 2013 or 2014."o' Because the

10

See California Air Resources Board, Discussion Draft--March 30, 2012 Amendments to the Cakfornia
Cap on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Market-Based Compliance Mechanisms to Allow for the Use of
Compliance Instruments Issued by Linked Jurisdictions § 95943 (2012); CalforniaLawmakers Seek Delay to
Quebec ETS Link (Point Carbon, May 24, 2012), online at http://www.pointcarbon.com/
news/1.1906365 (visited Oct 16, 2012).

101

See Western Climate Initiative, Designfor the WCI Regional Program 22 (July 2010). The Western
Climate Initiative originally was to include eleven western US states and Canadian provinces, and
now is likely to begin with California, Ontario, and Quebec, which are contemplating linking their
developing state/provincial CO 2 cap-and-trade systems beginning in 2013.
See Quebec Department of Sustainable Development, Environment, and Parks, Carbon Market in
North America-Adoption of Regulationsfor the Cap-and-TradeGHG Emission (Dec 15, 2011), online at
http://www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/infuseur/communique.asp?no=2012 (visited Oct 16, 2012).

102
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See International Emissions Trading Association, Summary of Quibec's Regulation Respecting a Capand-Trade System for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance 1 (Feb 23, 2012), online at
http://www.ieta.org/assets/ietasquebec/ 20cap%20and/o20trade%20summary.pdf (visited Oct
17, 2012).

104

See Quebec Environmental Quality Act, Regulation Respecting a Cap-and-Trade System for Greenhouse
Gas Emission Allowances, c. Q-2, r. 46.1 at III.I.37(3) (2012).
Id at 1.111.20(5), 111.1.37; International Emissions Trading Association, Summar of Qudbec's
Regulation at 11 (cited in 103).

105
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See Han, et al, China's Carbon Emission Trading: An Overview of Current Development at 10 (cited in
note 12).
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basic characteristics of these pilot systems (such as whether they will be
mandatory or voluntary, whether the caps will be absolute or intensity-based,
and what industries will be included) remain to be determined,107 it is not clear
whether or how these trading programs might link to other cap-and-trade or
credit systems.
5. South Korea's cap-and-trade system
In May of 2012, South Korea's parliament voted to establish a cap-andtrade program that will take effect in 2015. The program will apply to companies
whose annual emissions are greater than 125,000 metric tons of CO 2, as well as
to some smaller factories, buildings, and livestock producers.os The government
has not yet promulgated regulations governing offsets or linkage to other
systems.
6. Mexico's cap-and-trade system
In June of 2012, Mexico passed climate change legislation to establish a
voluntary cap-and-trade system. Companies who opt in to the system would be
able to sell their allowances in international markets.1o' Although the details of
the system remain to be worked out, Californian officials have already expressed
interest in exploring a future linkage between California's system and the
Mexican system."o
7. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
In 2009, the US House of Representatives passed the American Clean
Energy and Security Act (also known as the Waxman-Markey Bill), which would
have established a national CO 2 cap-and-trade system in the US. Although the
bill never became law, it offers some insight into US political preferences
regarding linkage with other systems. The bill would have allowed US firms to
use emissions allowances from foreign cap-and-trade systems, such as the EU
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online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-03/south-korean-parliament-approvescarbon-trading-system.htmi (visited Oct 16, 2012).
109

See Mexico's President Enacts Climate Change Legislation (BBC News Jun 6, 2012), online at
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ETS, but would have given the US Environmental Protection Agency the option
of establishing a limit on the percentage of a firm's emissions that could be
covered by such foreign allowances."' The bill would also have allowed the use
of both domestic and foreign (such as CDM) offset credits, with a combined
quantitative limit of up two billion tons per year (compared with a total
emissions cap of approximately five billion tons). Starting in 2018, the bill would
have applied an exchange rate of 1.25:1 when redeeming foreign offsets." 2
IV. THE DURBAN PLATFORM AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR LINKAGE
A considerable number of linkages have been established or are likely to be
established among regional, national, and sub-national tradable permit systems.
For better or worse, these linkages have been heavily influenced by the
longstanding UNFCCC distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I
responsibilities. In particular, because the UNFCCC institutional framework has
not encouraged developing countries to establish cap-and-trade systems, all links
to developing countries have been through the CDM-an emission-reductioncredit system with flaws related to lack of full additionality. However, the
Durban talks have opened up an opportunity for a new international framework
that could employ linkage to engage developing countries, reduce the global
costs of emissions reductions, and develop an institutional framework for a
future top-down or bottom-up international climate policy architecture.
A. The UNFCCC, the Berlin Mandate, and the Kyoto Protocol
Article 3 of the 1992 UNFCCC established a key principle:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance
with their common but defereniated responsibiliies and respeetive capabiliies.
Accordingly, the developed county Parties should take the lead in combating

climate change and the adverse effects thereof.113
The countries considered to be "developed country Parties" were listed in an
appendix to the 1992 Convention (Annex I) which included the members of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) plus most
of the emerging market economies of eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union.

"'I

112

13

See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454 §5 722(d)(3), 728(d).
Id at §§ 721(e), 722(d)(1).
See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Art 3 (1992), 1771 UN Treaty
Ser 107,169 (1994) (emphasis added).
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Three years after the Rio conference, at the first Conference of the Parties
of the Framework Convention (COP-1) in Berlin, the global community agreed
to the "Berlin Mandate."' 14 This agreement developed a specific interpretation of
"common but differentiated responsibilities" by establishing the dichotomous
distinction whereby the Annex I countries are to take on emission-reduction
responsibilities and the non-Annex I countries are to have no such
responsibilities whatsoever.
The Berlin Mandate, subsequently codified in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol via
numerical national targets for a limited set of countries, had wide-ranging,
worldwide consequences. The dichotomous structure has driven up aggregate
compliance costs to as much as four times their cost-effective level, because
many opportunities for low-cost emissions abatement in emerging economies
are taken off the table."' More problematic, an institutional structure was
thereby put in place that makes change and progress exceptionally difficult, if
not virtually impossible.
B. A New Approach Requiring Participation of All Parties
At the December 2011 UN talks in Durban, South Africa (COP-17), the
international community agreed to a negotiating process focused on the longterm participation of all parties in the effort to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions and combat climate change."' In particular, they adopted the goal of
reaching an agreement by 2015 that will bring all nations under the same legal
regime by 2020.
This Durban Platform for Enhanced Action completely eliminates the
Annex I/non-Annex I (or industrialized/developing country) distinction.
Nowhere in the text of the decision will one find phrases such as "Annex I" or
"historical responsibility," which had long since become code words for
emission targets applied exclusively to the richest countries.
Negotiators from around the world now have a challenging task before
them: to identify a new international climate policy architecture that is consistent
with the process, pathway, and principles laid out in the Durban Platform, while
still being consistent with the UNFCCC. In other words, the challenge is to find
a way to include all countries (or at least, the twenty largest national and regional
economies that together account for upwards of 80 percent of global GHG
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See UNFCCC, Reports of the Conference of the Parties on its FirstSession, Held at Berdnfrom 28 March to 7
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emissions) in a structure that brings about meaningful emission reduction on an
appropriate timetable at acceptable cost, while recognizing the different
circumstances of nations in a way that is more subtle and sophisticated than the
simple dichotomous distinction of years past.
Although the Durban Platform opens up a window to a variety of
promising international policy architectures,' 17 its implications for architectures
based on linkage are particularly important. By lessening a key obstacle to the
most meaningful international linkages-the absence of cap-and-trade systems
in developing countries-the Durban Platform has improved the chances of
future direct linkages among tradable permit systems in developed and
developing countries. Such linkages could serve a variety of roles in international
climate policy architecture.
V. LINKAGE AS A CLIMATE POLICY ARCHITECTURE
We consider the role that linkage could play in international climate policy
architecture. Our examination is informed both by political interest in and
economic experience with linkage. The existing and planned links among
regional, national, and sub-national climate change policies-as documented in
Section IlI-provide preliminary evidence regarding both the near-term and
long-term roles that linkage may play in global climate policy architecture.
A. Near-Term Role
In the years since the ratification of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, a patchwork
system of linkages has evolved among independent regional, national, and subnational climate policies. As described above, the current set of existing and
planned international links includes a number of direct connections: links
between trading systems in Europe, including the EU ETS, the EEA countries,
and (most likely in 2014) Switzerland; the planned links among the members of
the Western Climate Initiative, including the recently-announced linkage
between California and Quebec; and the planned link between Australia's
forthcoming cap-and-trade system and the New Zealand ETS, as well as
between Australia's system and the EU ETS (a development that could create an
indirect linkage between the EU ETS and New Zealand's ETS). Furthermore,
the CDM and JI offset markets provide a strong indirect linkage between the
European systems and the New Zealand ETS, and, depending on future
allowance prices, could provide an indirect linkage to RGGI.
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This sample of existing and planned links hints at the outline of a nearterm "system" that combines several regional, directly linked cap-and-trade
systems, with some level of indirect connection via a common credit system,
such as the CDM or a sectoral crediting program. Until a specific international
agreement is realized, such a bottom-up, decentralized system may become the
de facto structure for near-term to medium-term international climate policy
architecture." 8
Such a de facto near-term system could play two roles. First, it could
provide economic benefits such as cost savings and market liquidity while
(presumably) a future climate agreement is being negotiated. Second, by helping
to build an institutional framework of coordination among different systems,
near-term linkage could help with the political transition to a robust long-term
international climate policy architecture. We discuss these roles in more detail in
the following subsections.
1. Can linkage provide near-term cost savings and market liquidity?
In the short term, linkage may provide two main economic contributions:
creating cost savings, and improving market liquidity and stability. As discussed
in Section II, the key economic rationale for linking two systems is to lower the
aggregate costs of emissions reductions. Because GHG emissions have the same
effect on climate change regardless of where in the world they originate, linkage
allows firms in high-cost systems to pay for less expensive abatement
opportunities in lower-cost systems while still achieving the same overall
environmental benefit. Furthermore, because linkage increases the number of
market participants available to buy and sell allowances and credits, it can
thicken markets and reduce problems with price volatility.
Experience suggests that direct linkages between cap-and-trade systems do
in fact help to improve market functioning. The best example of the economic
benefits of direct linkage comes from the EU ETS. Although allowance markets
during the EU ETS trial phase showed signs of thinness, more recent trading
periods have had higher volumes and greater efficiency."'
However, although linkage can help with market functioning, the nearterm cost savings from direct links between cap-and-trade systems may be
modest. Because two-way links are currently planned primarily between systems
in highly developed nations, direct links may not be able to help regulated firms
take advantage of very low-cost abatement opportunities (such as those available
in developing countries). Furthermore, direct linkages suffer from a climate
us

The Durban Platform calls for an agreement to be reached by 2015 for implementation in 2020.

119 See Alberto Montagnoli and Frans de Vries, Carbon Trading Thickness and Market Eftidency, 32 Ener

Econ 1331, 1335 (2010).
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policy irony: the links that are most attractive for economic reasons-those
between systems with very different allowance prices (such as RGGI and the
EU ETS)-may be politically the most difficult to establish because of the large
international capital flows that such links would generate.
Links with a credit system can also contribute to the near-term goals of
cost-minimization and market liquidity. In principle, a near-term set of indirect
links could yield much of the cost savings and other advantages of a broad set of
multilateral links. This system of indirect links would preserve a high level of
national control over domestic carbon markets, thus allowing countries to tailor
policies to fit their specific political and economic circumstances.
In practice, the ability of credit systems-in particular, the CDM-to
create meaningful indirect links between cap-and-trade systems has been mixed.
On the positive side, allowance prices in the New Zealand ETS, which allows
unlimited purchase of CDM offset credits, have been strongly influenced by
developments in the CDM and the EU ETS.120 However, despite the potential
cost-savings from linking to a credit system, some cap-and-trade systems (such
as in California and Quebec) have chosen to allow only selected external
credits.121 Others have imposed quantity limits on the use of external credits,
have designed application procedures that make it difficult to receive approval
for new offset projects, or have implemented trigger mechanisms that only allow
the use of foreign offsets if domestic allowance prices exceed some predetermined level.122 This general reluctance to allow links with credit systems (in
particular, with the CDM) is motivated by concerns about additionality, as well
as an emphasis on achieving domestic emissions reductions. Therefore, whether
indirect links can improve the stability and cost-effectiveness of domestic carbon
markets will depend largely on broader acceptance and use of credit systems
such as the CDM.
Although indirect linkage has clear benefits, it could also have destabilizing
effects on offset markets in developing countries. Such a situation could arise as
the result of limits that many systems are placing on the use of external offset
credits. Consider a simple example, depicted in Figure 1, in which the world
economy contains only two systems: a cap-and-trade system and an emissionreduction-credit system. Suppose that the cap-and-trade system limits the
number of offset credits that domestic entities can use for compliance, and that
this limit is binding. As a result, the ERC system will have an oversupply of

120
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See Stian Reklev and Naomi Tajitsu, NZ Spot Carbon Prices Recover fmm Sell-Of (Reuters Mar 2,
2012), online at http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL4E8E171W20120302
(visited Oct 16, 2012).
See Section III.B.2-3.
See Section III.A.
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emission reduction opportunities that would be profitable at current allowance
prices, and the market for credits will fail to clear. The situation is potentially
even worse when there are two or more cap-and-trade systems with binding
limits on the use of external offsets. Because the market for offset credits will
fail to clear, there will be multiple prices for credits, with prices depending on
the allowance price in each separate cap-and-trade system. In either case, the
markets would face problems with transparency, and the resulting uncertainty
could create substantial business risks that might drive up the costs of emissions
reductions. In particular, companies that make investments in offset projects
would face the risk that they would be unable to sell their CERs at any price due
to the binding limits on offset sales.
How likely is such a scenario? Table 1 summarizes limits on the use of
offsets and credits for compliance in existing and planned systems. The table
shows, for example, that after 2013, credits may make up no more than half of
aggregate EU ETS emissions reductions. Other systems have also imposed
limits. If nations pursue substantial emissions reduction goals while maintaining
limits on offset credits, it is possible that limits on offsets will increasingly bind.
The current (May 2012) discount of CER prices relative to EU ETS allowanceprices123 suggests that this may already be happening.
2. Can linkage provide a foundation for a future policy architecture?
Although most of the ongoing discussions about potential linkages focus
on the economic benefits of linking systems with different marginal abatement
costs, linkage may provide an additional set of benefits, which are fundamentally
political. By helping to build an institutional framework of coordination among
different systems, near-term linkage could help create a pathway to a robust
long-term international climate policy architecture.
In the short term there will probably be several regional sets of directly
linked systems, with some indirect linkage through the CDM or other
offset/sectoral crediting programs. Based on the limited political evidence
available to date, this system may transition toward a system with greater
numbers of two-way and multilateral direct links. Such a network of linked capand-trade systems would preserve some national autonomy while requiring
increased coordination of legislation, regulation, and institutions. Thus, in the
same way that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade transitioned into the
World Trade Organization, a bottom-up system of links could, in principle,
provide the basic institutional framework for a broader climate agreement. The
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creation of a broad set of links could generate not only experience but also some
degree of mutual trust among nations, and could supply at least a natural starting
point for diplomatic negotiations.
Of course, linkage could also create political and regulatory obstacles to a
future agreement. Creating a linkage between two systems requires agreement
about a variety of design characteristics, including the stringency of the cap in
each system. Because linkage can make it difficult for countries to change such
design characteristics, it might make it more difficult for countries to make the
adjustments necessary to support some future climate agreement.
Linkage could help to support a future climate agreement in another way: by
providing participation incentives for nations to adopt market-based climate
policies. Major developed countries with cap-and-trade systems may be expected
to attempt to use offset programs as both a carrot and stick to stimulate
developing country participation.
The best example of this may be EU ETS policy toward CDM offsets from
developing countries. Whereas between 2008 and 2012 the EU ETS allowed
regulated entities to use CDM credits originating in any developing country,
beginning in 2013 new CDM credits will only be allowed for projects originating
in LDCs (thus excluding China and India). 24 This policy shift is deliberate;
recent EU documents state that "[w]hile initially the use of international credits
was allowed for cost-effective compliance, this has been complemented with the
objective of actively using the leverage the EU possesses as the by far most
important source of demand for international credits." 2 s Furthermore, the EU
ETS website states that the "EU has set out a vision for the development of an
international carbon market: the market is expected to develop through bottomup linking of compatible domestic cap-and-trade systems."126 An OECD-wide
carbon market is expected by 2015, which would be extended to include
economically more advanced developing countries by 2020 and "[n]ew sectoral
crediting mechanisms would be a stepping stone towards establishing cap and
trade systems in these developing countries." 1 27 Whether or not this EU linkage
strategy will be effective is difficult to predict.
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3. Obstacles to near-term linkage
It is important to keep in mind that a variety of political, institutional, and
economic factors will determine the types of links that are formed in the near
future. Recent political experience suggests that it has not been difficult to
establish direct linkages between existing and planned cap-and-trade systems in
developed countries. However, these direct linkages are occurring primarily
between jurisdictions that already have strong economic, political, and/or
geographic ties.
One obstacle to the establishment of additional direct links between capand-trade systems is the need to harmonize cost-containment measures and
reach mutual agreement about emissions caps. This may prove to be a particular
challenge for a direct link between the EU ETS and North American cap-andtrade systems. For example, because California's system includes an allowance
reserve and RGGI's system includes an allowance price trigger for the use of
additional offset credits, links to the EU ETS would result in automatic
propagation of these cost control measures.
An additional obstacle to direct linkage is the diversity of stringency across
systems. For example, a link between RGGI and the EU ETS is unlikely in the
near future, given the current difference in allowance prices in the two systems
($1.93 per allowance in RGGI versus $8.53 per allowance in the EU ETS). 2 8
Such a link would result in large capital flows from Europe to the United States,
and could be perceived as Europeans subsidizing lackluster US ambition.
Although the idea of linkage to a common credit system is also appealing,
given that such a mechanism would not require systems to harmonize design
features, such linkage also faces some practical obstacles. First, most existing and
planned cap-and-trade systems have placed restrictions on the use of offset
credits. Table I summarizes these restrictions. The table shows, for example,
that although many EU ETS participants have had relatively generous limits on
credits for the 2008 to 2012 compliance period, future limits will allow credits to
make up no more than half of aggregate EU ETS emissions reductions after
2013. Other systems have also imposed relatively low limits.
Second, although the CDM is currently the world's most important
supplier of offset credits, it is not clear that it will continue in this role in the
future. Beginning in 2013, the EU ETS-the largest source of demand for offset
credits-will only accept new offsets from CDM projects in LDCs. This
requirement implies that China and India, which together have produced 68
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percent of CDM offsets to date, will no longer be eligible to sell CERs into the
European market. What program or institution might replace the CDM is
unknown. Recent UN discussions have centered on the possibility of "new
market mechanisms," a vaguely defined set of sectoral crediting mechanisms that
would require host country engagement and possibly emissions reduction
commitments.'29 Other jurisdictions, such as California's AB 32 system, have
begun developing other protocols for certifying emissions reduction credits
from international sources.
A third set of obstacles to indirect linkage via a credit system are the policy
goals-espoused by many European countries-of achieving domestic
emissions reductions and promoting investment in renewable energy sources.
Because allowing the use of credits has the effect of reducing allowance prices,
linkage to a credit system (or even to a cap-and-trade system with a lower
allowance price) reduces incentives for domestic firms to invest in renewable
energy and other "green" technologies. The desire to achieve this separate policy
goal may create political opposition to linkage. For example, European
Commission documents reflect a clear concern that most emissions reductions
be achieved domestically."o Such emphasis was also exhibited in the Kyoto
Protocol: "The acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental to
domestic actions for the purposes of meeting commitments.""'

B. Long-Term Role
In the long term, linkage could contribute to international climate policy
architecture in at least two ways.'32 First, linkage could serve as an element of a
broader international climate architecture. In such a system, linkage might play
several different roles. In the short term, indirect linkages via a common credit
system might serve as an implicit framework that would provide market liquidity
and some cost savings, while still allowing nations to maintain control over
domestic allowance markets. In the longer term, nations might successfully
negotiate a top-down climate agreement that specifies targets and timetables for
emissions reductions. Such an architecture might include a more comprehensive
set of multilateral linkages between industrialized and developing countries that
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would allow nations to achieve more stringent emissions targets at lower
aggregate cost.
A second possibility is that a set of unilateral emissions commitments in a
pledge-and-review system combined with a decentralized set of links could serve
as a stand-alone, bottom-up architecture.'33 As discussed above, the near-term
outlines of such an architecture may already be emerging, with regional trading
partners choosing to link directly with each other, with broader indirect linkages
via the CDM or new sectoral crediting mechanisms, and with the Copenhagen
Accord'3 4 and the Cancun Agreements 3 1 providing a pledge-and-review system
of essentially voluntary national targets. As more jurisdictions establish cap-andtrade systems, this somewhat fragmented near-term system could evolve into a
broader bottom-up architecture that includes a wide set of direct linkages.
Whether such a decentralized architecture could achieve meaningful
environmental results in a cost-effective manner depends on several factors.
First, a sufficient number of large emitters would have to agree to participate in
the system. Participation by industrialized countries would need to be selfmotivated, and there are a number of potential incentives that might induce
developing countries to participate. These include positive incentives (carrots),
such as development assistance and the opportunity to sell allowances or offset
credits, as well as negative incentives (sticks), such as carbon border adjustments
or the imposition of graduation requirements as conditions for the opportunity
to sell offset credits.
Second, participating nations would have to commit to substantial
unilateral emissions reductions. In developed countries, these commitments
would most likely be motivated by internal politics. In developing countries,
commitments would most likely depend on participation incentives provided by
developed countries. The emissions targets would either be decided unilaterally
or negotiated during the process of establishing and renewing direct linkages.
The set of voluntary commitments made thus far under the Copenhagen Accord
and the Cancun Agreements are probably insufficient for achieving the
politically endorsed international target of stabilizing greenhouse gas
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concentrations at 450 ppm C0 2-equivalent (related to limiting average global
warming to 2oC)."'
Third and finally, for such an international policy architecture to be costeffective, it would require links among GHG trading systems in industrialized
and developing countries. As discussed above, the near-term prospects for such
a comprehensive set of links are mixed.
VI. CONCLUSION
By replacing the UNFCCC's Berlin Mandate, the Durban Platform for
Enhanced Action has opened an important window. National delegations from
around the world now have a challenging task before them: to identify by 2015
(for implementation in 2020) a new international climate policy architecture that
is consistent with the process, pathway, and principles laid out in the Durban
Platform. This will require finding a way to include all key countries in a
structure that brings about meaningful emissions reductions on an appropriate
timetable at acceptable cost, while remaining within the overall framework and
principles provided by the UNFCCC.
On both a positive and normative basis, there is considerable attraction to
bottom-up, decentralized international policy architectures. Among these, the
most promising may be linkage among tradable permit systems, whether in the
form of a near-term, de facto architecture of organic linkages among regional,
national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, or in the form of a long-term
replacement for the centralized, top-down architecture that characterizes the
Kyoto Protocol. The Durban Platform has improved the likelihood of
establishing the types of developed-developing country linkages necessary to
support these climate architectures.
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Table 1: Summary of Limits on the Use of Offset Credits
System

Period

Limit as % of Cap

Notes

EU ETS

2013-

TBD

(a)

EU ETS: Austria

2008-2012

10

EU ETS: Belgium

2008-2012

8.4

EU ETS: Czech Republic

2008-2012

10

EU ETS: Estonia

2008-2012

0

EU ETS: Finland

2008-2012

10

EU ETS: France

2008-2012

13.5

EU ETS: Hungary

2008-2012

10

EU ETS: Germany

2008-2012

12

EU ETS: Greece

2008-2012

9

EU ETS: Ireland

2008-2012

10

EU ETS: Italy

2008-2012

14.99

EU ETS: Latvia

2008-2012

10

EU ETS: Lithuania

2008-2012

20

EU ETS: Luxembourg

2008-2012

10

EU ETS: Netherlands

2008-2012

10

EU ETS: Poland

2008-2012

10

EU ETS: Slovakia

2008-2012

7

EU ETS: Slovenia

2008-2012

15.76

EU ETS: Spain

2008-2012

20

EU ETS: Sweden

2008-2012

10

EU ETS: United Kingdom

2008-2012

8

Swiss ETS

2008-

8

New Zealand ETS

2008-

unlimited

Australia's Clean Energy Act

2012-

12.5

(b)

RGGI

2009-

California's CAT system

2013-

3.3
8 or 0

(c)
(d)

Quebec's CAT system

2013-

8 or 0

(d)

Notes: (a) The European Commission will choose a limit that allows credits to make up no more than 50
percent of emissions reductions. (b) From 2012 to 2015, the government may impose afee ofAUD$15 to
AUD$17 per credit. The 12.5 percent limit applies to Kyoto credits (ERUs and CERs). (c)RGGIs limit
rises to 5 percent if allowanceprices exceed $7, and to 10 percent if allowanceprices exceed approximately
$10. (d) Neither Cakfornia norQuebec recogniZe ofsetsfrom UNFCCCflexibility mechanisms such as the
CDM, although Calfornia bar recently completed an MOU to allow deforestation creditsfrom the states of
Acre, Brazil, and Chiapas, Mexico.
Sources: See text above, and European Commission, Emissions Trading: Commission Adopts
Decisions on Amendments to Five National Allocation Plans for 2008-2012 (Juy 13, 2007).
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Figure 1: Allowance Market with Binding Limit on Offsets

D

Q*a
Legend: D represents demandfor emissions permits. S. and S, represent the supply of
domestic allowances and offset credits, respectivey. Qc represents the (binding) limit on
offset sales. S.+, represents aggregate supply of allowances and offset credits. Q*, and Q*
represent the number of allowances and credits that would be supplied at the marketprice
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